Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1989

The State of Utah v. Karen Marie Johnson : Reply
Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joan C. Watt; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Dan R. Larsen; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Johnson, No. 890175.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2563

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

JTAH
X"CUM INT
<FU
45.9
,S9
DOCKET NO.

BRIEF

99o/3T
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 890175
Priority No. 2

KAREN MARIE JOHNSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding.

JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DAN R. LARSEN
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

FILI
MAY 7 WW
Clerk, Supreme coun, Utab

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 890175
Priority No. 2

KAREN MARIE JOHNSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding.

JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DAN R. LARSEN
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

INTRODUCTION

1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
CONCLUSION

1
9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES CITED
Mallarino v. State. 379 S.E.2d 210 (Ga. 1989) . . . .
New York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860,
69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981)
Pennsylvania v. Miroms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
People v. Branch. 134 Misc.2d 705, 512 N.Y.S.2d
(Sup. Ct. 1987)
People v. David L.. 56 N.Y.2d 698, 451 N.Y.S.2d 722,
436 N.E.2d 1324 (1981), cert, denied 459 U.S. 866
(1982)
People v. Liviani. 88 A.D.2d 386, 453 N.Y.S.2d 708
(1982), aff'd 58 N.Y.2d 894, 460 N.Y.S.2d 530,
447 N.E.2d 1324 (1981)
State v. Damm. Kan. Sup. Ct. No. 62,897 (March 3,
1990), 46 Cr.L. 1509
State v. Davis. 452 So.2d 1208 (La. App. 1984)

. . .

State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 329 (Utah App. 1989).
Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
United States v. Harris. 528 F.2d 1327 (1975) . . . .

11

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 890175
Priority No. 2

KAREN MARIE JOHNSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Facts, and
Statement of the Case are set forth in Appellant's opening brief at
1-5.

Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to Point I of

Appellee's brief.

The remaining argument is adequately briefed in

Appellant's Opening Brief and requires no reply.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Officer Stroud lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to
detain Appellant for a warrants check.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT.
(Reply to Appellee's Point I)
It is well established that the scope and duration of any
seizure "must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances
which rendered its initiation permissible" [citations omitted].

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).

Detaining Ms. Johnson to run

a warrants check exceeded the scope of any permissible detention in
this case.

See generally State v. Damm, Kan. Sup.Ct. No. 62,897

(March 3, 1990), 46 Cr.L. 1509 (impermissible to detain driver while
running warrants check on passengers).
The State attempts to justify the detention by focusing on
the safety rationale set forth in Pennsylvania v. Mimms. 434 U.S.
106 (1977).

Appellee's Brief at 8, 12. Such a safety rationale is

inapplicable to the present case since there is no indication that
either Appellant or the driver did anything to cause the officer to
be concerned for his safety.

The officer did not ask Ms. Johnson to

get out of the car nor did he search her for weapons.

Instead, he

asked her for identification, then detained her while running a
warrants check.

The officer's actions did nothing to protect his

safety in this case.

Therefore, the issue of whether the Mimms

holding regarding a driver should be extended to a passenger where
there are no specific facts indicating the passenger is armed is not
relevant to this case.
All of the cases cited by the State for the proposition
that "[o]ther courts have extended the Mimms ruling to allow a
police officer to detain passengers in a routine traffic stop by
also ordering the passengers out of the vehicle" (Appellee's Brief
at 8) are therefore not pertinent since the officer testified that
he did not order Ms. Johnson out of the vehicle and he did not
search her for weapons.
The cases cited by the State on page 8 of its brief in
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support of the propositiion set forth above are distinguishable as
follows.

In People v. Branch, 134 Misc. 2d 705, 512 N.Y.S.2d 642

(Sup.Ct. 1987), the New York Supreme Court held that an officer
could order a passenger who was making furtive movements out of a
vehicle stopped for a traffic matter and frisk him for weapons where
both the driver and another passenger who had run from the vehicle
were carrying guns.

The Branch Court acknowledged that "one cannot

be stopped or arrested for merely being in the company of another"
(citations omitted).

Branch at 643. The Court made a distinction

between the ability of an officer to order a passenger out of a
vehicle for safety reasons and the constitutional ability to
thereafter frisk that person.

Id.

Based on the facts of that case

and a safety rationale, the Court upheld the frisk.
In People v. Livicrni, 88 A.D.2d 386, 453 N.Y.S.2d 708
(1982), aff d, 58 N.Y.2d 894, 460 N.Y.S.2d 530, 447 N.E.2d 1324
(1981), the court addressed the "narrow question" of whether a
police officer can "order a passenger out of the vehicle at gunpoint
because of the officer's observation of an empty gun holster in
plain view in the passenger compartment of the vehicle."
708.

Livigni at

As was the case in Branch, the decision that such action was

permissible was based on a safety rationale and specific facts
indicating the passenger might be armed, neither of which is present
in the instant case.
Similarly, in People v. David L., 56 N.Y.2d 698, 451
N.Y.S.2d 722, 436 N.E.2d 1324 (1981), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 866
(1982), a gun in the waist band of the passenger was visible to the
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officer, as the passenger moved along the seat.1
In the instant case, where the officer's actions indicated
he was not concerned about weapons and where no specific facts
linked Ms. Johnson to criminal activity (or even suggested that the
driver was involved in anything other than traffic violations), the
cases cited by the State in support of an extension of the Mimms
rationale are inapplicable.
The State asks this Court to give deference to the trial
court findings, then quotes a portion of the court's ruling.
Appellee's Brief at 9.

For clarification, Appellant includes the

entire ruling as Addendum A.

The portion of the court's ruling

quoted by the State contains at least three findings that
demonstrate that the ruling should not be relied upon by this Court
in reaching its decision.
First, as set forth more fully in footnote 5 on page 11 of
Appellant's opening brief, the officer was not aware that the
driver's license was suspended when he detained Appellant (T. 6, 7,
15).

Therefore, the trial court's finding that the suspended

license supported the reasonableness of the detention should not be
given deference, nor should the erroneous reliance on that finding
by the Court of Appeals be given weight.

See State v. Johnson. 771

P.2d 326, 329 (Utah App. 1989).

1

The narrow question addressed in David L. was whether
the officer could open the door "during the course of an
investigation" following a traffic stop. People v. David L., 439
N.Y.S.2d 152, 154, 81 A.D.2d 893 (1981).

-
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Second, the trial court's statement that "there is no
indication of who the owner of the car was" (T. 46) is not supported
by the record.

The officer never asked the driver or Ms. Johnson

who the owner was or how the driver came to be in possession of the
car.
Finally, in the last paragraph of the ruling quoted by the
State on page 9 of its brief, the Court stated:
I think the officer had a legitimate reason to
ask the passenger as to her identity to determine
the identity of the driver, because the vehicle's
registration was not present, and the owner was not
known, and I think the officer was exercising a
legitimate concern in regards to the ownership of
the vehicle and to whether the vehicle may have
possibly been either stolen or being driven without
possibly the owner's consent.
(T. 46-7) (emphasis added).

This paragraph suggests that the trial

court confused the issue of whether it was proper to ask the
passenger her name in an attempt to ascertain whether the passenger
was the owner with the issue of whether it was proper to detain the
passenger for a warrants check.
In its argument, the State focuses on the propriety of
temporarily detaining a passenger where the State has a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the passenger is armed and dangerous, or
to ascertain whether the driver has the owner's permission to drive
the vehicle or to ascertain whether the passenger is licensed to
drive.

Appellee's brief at 12-13.
The State ignores the fact, however, that (1) the officer

did not investigate whether the vehicle was stolen, but instead ran
a warrants check; (2) the officer did not have a reasonable,
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articulable suspicion Appellant was armed; and (3) the officer was
not investigating whether Appellant was licensed to drive*
The State cites United States v. Harris, 528 F.2d 1327
(1975), for the proposition that an officer may "request that a
passenger remain seated while investigating a routine traffic stop"
in order to "solicit the passenger's aid in identifying the driver
and owner of the vehicle in determining whether the driver has the
owner's permission to operate the vehicle."
12.

Appellee's Brief at

In Harris, an officer stopped a vehicle which illegally

displayed both a current Missouri license plate cind an in-transit
sticker.

After stopping the vehicle, the officer observed scratches

and scrapes around the rivets which bolted the vehicle
identification number (VIN) to the dash.

Because the VIN appeared

to have been tampered with, the officer checked with the National
Crime Information Center (NCIC) and ascertained that the vehicle was
in fact stolen.2
Harris is distinguishable from the present case since the
number identifying the vehicle appeared to be tampered with, giving
rise to a suspicion that the vehicle had been stolen.

In addition,

the officer did not exceed the scope of any reasonable detention

2

As the Court noted in footnote 1, 528 F.2d at 1327:

The National Crime Information Center (N.C.I.C.) is
a department within the Federal Bureau of
Investigation which records on computer the vehicle
identification numbers of stolen vehicles for law
enforcement purposes. Safety patrol officers are
able to complete such a check by radio in a matter
of minutes.
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since he immediately pursued the possibility that the vehicle was
stolen rather than detaining passengers to run a warrants check.
The State cites State v. Davis, 452 So.2d 1208, 1212 (La.
App. 1984) for the proposition that officers may detain a passenger
"to question the passenger whether he or she is licensed to drive in
the event that the driver is unable or unlicensed to drive the
vehicle from the scene of the stop." Appellee's brief at 12-13.

In

Davis, the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle he claimed was
owned by his wife.

The officers ran a check on the driver and

thereafter placed the driver under arrest as the result of
information obtained in the check.
According to the officers, Davis was moving "uneasily" in
the passenger seat and officers ordered him out of the vehicle for
safety purposes; after Davis exited the vehicle, officers noticed a
bulge which they believed might be a weapon.
searched Mr. Davis and located a gun.3

Officers therefore

The Court discussed the

application of the Mimms safety rationale to a passenger and
determined that it was appropriate under the circumstances of the
case.

Although the court did note that the passenger could not

produce a driver's license or identification which would permit

3

The defendant presented a different version of what
occurred. According to the defendant, the officers ordered him out
of the vehicle and placed him under arrest for not having adequate
identification. The officers then searched the vehicle and located
the gun. The appellate court upheld the search under either version
of the facts; it relied on New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101
S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), for its determination that a
search of the vehicle was proper after a lawful custodial arrest.
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officers to let him drive away, it based its decision on the
totality of the circumstances.
The facts of the instant case are quite different from
those in Davis.

The passenger did not claim to be the wife of the

owner of the vehicle and in fact made no claims to the vehicle.

The

safety rationale in Mimms was inapplicable, and, at the time the
officer decided to detain Ms. Johnson for a warrants check, he did
not know that the driver was not properly licensed and would
therefore be unable to drive the car.
The State relies on Mallarino v. State, 379 S.E.2d 210, 213
(Ga. 1989) for the proposition that "where a routine traffic stop
has escalated into something more based upon a reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot, a police officer may detain the
vehicle occupants for further investigation" (Appellee's brief at
13) and that under the circumstances of the case, "it was reasonable
for Stroud to continue to detain the driver and defendant to
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more
information."

Appellee's brief at 11.

In Mallarino, the appellant

was the driver of the vehicle, not the passenger, and the issues
raised by the appellant that the stop of the vehicle was pretextual
and that his consent to search the vehicle was not voluntary were
discussed in that context.

The Court did not directly address the

limits placed on the detention of a passenger.

The Mallarino Court

reiterated the well established rule:
In assessing the reasonableness of the length of
detention, it is appropriate to examine "whether the
police diligently pursued a means of investigation
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that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was
necessary to detain the defendant." (Citations
omitted.)
Mallarino, 379 S.E.2d at 213.
In the present case, the officer did not diligently pursue
an investigation that would confirm or dispel his hunch that the
vehicle might have been stolen.

Under the circumstances of this

case, the officer violated the fourth amendment by detaining
Ms. Johnson for a warrants check.

CONCLUSION
Appellant, KAREN MARIE JOHNSON, by and through counsel,
JOAN C. WATT, respectfully requests that this Court reverse her
conviction and remand the case for a new trial absent the illegally
seized evidence.
SUBMITTED this

I

day of May, 1990.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

1

officer or the defendant, the sequence of events that

2

took place are a little bit different in regards to when

3

the stop was made, what took place,as to whether she was

4

asked to wait there or she was told, "I will be right

5

back," and whether implicit in his saying, "I will be

6

right back," that that could be interpreted to mean, "You

7

have to wait until I get back."

8
9

The way she indicated was that, "You wait
here and," you know, "I am going to run a check," after

10

he got the name, first of the driver, then of the passenger.

11

Whether she got out of the car when she gave the name,

12

and I believe he also asked for the birth date, wasn't

13

it, at that same time?

14

MS. LOY: Yes.

15

THE COURT:

Or whether she got out of the

15

car and

went to the officer's car and at that time she

17

gave him the name and birth date.

18

has heard, the Court is of the opinion that the motion

19

to suppress should be denied.

20

that based on the evidence that has been given, and taking

21

into consideration both the officer and the defendant

22

were under oath and gave slightly different versions of

23

exactly what happened, that the officer's testimony in

24

regards to the stopping being based on a violation of

25

the law and the driver not having produced the, I believe

Based on what the Court

The Court is of the opinion

46

1

it was the driver's license that was valid at the time,

2

plus having no registration, there was no indication of

3

who the owner of the car was, and the officer had some

4

question in regards to whether the car may possibly have

5

been stolen, although the testimony that was given was

6

that the —

7

a stolen vehicle and particularly of this vehicle itself.

8
9
10

there was no recent notice that there was

There was no registration in the vehicle,
and the driver herself was not the owner.
I think the officer had a legitimate reason

11

to ask the passenger as to her identity to determine the

12

identity ofthe driver, because the vehicle's registration

13

was not present, and the owner was not known, and I think

14

the officer was exercising a legitimate concern in regards

15

to the ownership of the vehicle and to whether the vehicle

16

may have possibly been either stolen or being driven without

17

possibly the owner's consent.

18

there is some dispute as to where the inquiry was made,

19

whether the parties were required to remain there and

20

whether there was in fact a detention at the time, and

21

whether the detention may have been longer than permissible

22

under the cases that were provided by Miss Loy.

23

And that upon making inquiry,

There is some cases that she has cited that

24

the Court had some question on in regards to whether she

25

was right and that initial stop was made for a traffic

47

1

violation, and all the matters in regards to the traffic

2

violation were already pursued, and anything further would

3

be

4

of time was longer than what normally would be called

5

a temporary stop to make inquiry.

6

legal, and detention would be legal, and the length

There is some controversy as to whether it

7

was 15 minutes or less than that.

But it appears to the

8

Court it was a reasonable period of time that evolved

9

and transpired in regards to this particular stop here.

10

Based on the officer's inquiry and finding

11

out that there was a warrant out for the defendant, he

12

made a legal arrest and incident to that arrest he made

13

inquiry regarding the backpack that she was carrying.

14

And she initially indicated it was not hers and later

15

on apparently her name was on there and was identified,

16

and she admitted it was hers.

17

a legitimate right and a legal right to make inquiry into

18

the contents of the pack, being that first there was a

19

denial, some question as to the ownership, if in fact

20

the sequence is that she denied the ownership and later

21

on made an admission, there's some question in the officer's

22

mind as to actually the ownership of the bag at the time,

23

that he decided that he was going to make inquiry into

24

the contents of the bag, and I think it's incident to

25

a valid arrest that he did make that inquiry.

I think the officer had
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1

This may be one of those cases you may have

2

to take up, because I think there's no cases on point

3

that either of you have brought up, and it's really very

4

close.

5

the opinion that there was a valid arrest, there was a

6

valid stop, and that there was valid seizure.

7

But based on the circumstances, the Court is of

MS. LOY:

Your Honor, with that ruling in

8

mind, when would you like me to appear with my client

9

for pretrial?

10

Should we do that on Monday or next Friday?

THE COURT:

Looks like we will not be able

11

to go on this case as scheduled because I am not sure

12

how long this other case is going to —

13

THE CLERK:

How about next Friday at 9:00?

14

THE COURT:

Next Friday at 9:00.

15

MR. JONES:

Can't we set it now?

16

the attorneys.

Do you need your client?

17

MS. LOY:

18

not here today that we1re not —

19
20
21

We have

I am concerned today that she's

MR. JONES:

Why don't we set a date and if

that causes problems, we can get back to it.
MS. LOY:

That's fine with us.

She's out

22

of custody and, frankly, it's going to take me until toward

23

the end of March to be rid of these Nixon cases.

24

are not too many dates between now and then.

25

THE COURT:

So there

What date?
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